The breadth and scope of the term ‘security’ is often problematic for policy analysts and political scientists. For better or worse, politicians of prior decades had the benefit of cut-and-dry definitions, most often based on war and nation. With the rise of jihadi violence and other amorphous international organizations, many define ‘security’ as survival vis-à-vis any existential threat, be it state or non-state actors. Expanding from this vague, all-encompassing treatment of ‘security’, there has been much discourse on the securitization of fields not previously identified as a ‘threat’. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11^th, 2001, one area of increasing attention is immigration. Once portrayed as an economic and cultural concern, the ebb and flow of peoples across borders is being recast as a threat towards national security and survival. There are many motivations that may entice a political party, individual, or government to portray migration in a security-oriented context. Conversely, there are many reasons why one might seek to avoid the securitization of this particular field. Regardless of motive, there are lasting effects in both policy and populace in terms of immigration law and law enforcement.

The process of ‘securitization’ occurs when an issue is portrayed as an urgent, fundamental, and profound risk to society, thus requiring special, decisive treatment by leaders and the governing elite. The method through which migration can be framed in a security context is simple; the central thesis being that current immigration is a threat to society through violence, socio-economic failures, and divisions in cultural identity. Migration often arouses the greatest debate because it is the nexus of the government’s responsibility of international security and internal security. This places in to question the fundamental principles of borders, sovereignty, and citizenship. Put simply, immigration has become the new ‘focus for insecurity’ in many western nations. Why would politicians present migration in such a way? What are the benefits?

In terms of practical, policy-oriented benefits, there occurs a consolidation of power by the various security organizations. These agencies are now able to expand their influences and capabilities to the field of immigration policy. This can involve domestic surveillance, border restrictions, and increased policing powers. By framing migration as an existential threat to everyday life, security facets of the government are now able to operate beyond the strict limitations imposed on other endeavors, and are better equipped to deal with specific threats. This can be advantageous on many fronts. Western democracies often view migration (correctly or incorrectly) as a threat to state sovereignty by promoting informal economies (primarily through crime networks and illegal immigration), reducing the state’s capacity to operate as the unitary ‘control maximizer’ (the only party able to exercise physical control and security), and jeopardizing previously existing cultural identities. By placing migration in a security context, the state is now better able to pursue policies that will mitigate these ills; such as deploying the military to the border to reduce illegal immigration. Mobilization, increased legitimacy, power-consolidation, and the ability to pursue harsher policies can be quite beneficial to an administration that lacks in any or all of the four. However, securitizing migration can be problematic on many levels as well.

Critics of this process, such as Alessandra Buonfino of Cambridge University, help us to better understand the limitations and problems caused by securitization of migration. The fundamental contradiction, he argues, is that no government in the west (barring specific right-wing elements, often on the periphery) is advocating the closure of borders or the expulsion of immigrants; the economic necessity is simply too great. Thus, much of this process is only seen on a rhetorical and political level. In practice, not much in migration policy has changed since September 11^th, 2001, as many would have expected. Political rhetoric based on fear of difference, with little to no tangible benefits for a weary public promotes an array of problems. It simultaneously decreases the population’s tolerance towards pre-existing migrants; while at the same time increases the population’s tolerance towards governmental abuse of said migrants. This creates further insecurity within the society, a willingness to ignore human rights violations, and an unrealistic, unattainable normative view of how the society ought to operate. Apart from the toleration of human rights violations, the securitization of migration can directly cause these infringements. Examples can be seen in Europe, where an estimated 2,500 immigrants, many from Asia, have died trying to illegally enter Europe in the previous decade. Ultimately, framing migration in a security-based, rhetorical context ‘increase(s) public fear of an already existing process”, and instills within the public an insecurity that can simply not be ‘fixed’ in our current globalizing world.

While securitization can have many advantages for the government and ruling elite, it yields very little benefit for the populace. Politicians are able to mobilize the public through fear and instability, which in turn leads to electoral victories. However, this rhetoric has very little effect on the actual policy that emanates from the victorious administration. In fact, while the increased usage of security terminology in connection with migration has been widespread since Sept. 2001, there has been very little change in policy. One long-term benefit that might exist for the general public would be the increased capability of counter-terrorism measures. These measures, however, would have no effect on the problems being associated with the current immigration policy, such as crime rates or job loss. One could make the argument that all of these developments would be acceptable were the threat from immigration real, and the promises capable of fulfillment. However, it is clear from history and current practice that the promises made on the campaign trail are far from the realities that exist afterwards. The economic necessity, particularly in an aging Europe, is too great to refuse entry to these immigrants. By framing migration as a security threat, the governments of many western nations are able to reap the benefits of a mobilized, loyal population whilst lying to a weary public of the dangers facing them. Thus, it is clear that there are many short-term benefits that a government can reap from posing the issue as such. It can maintain its rule, consolidate its power, and work more efficiently in related fields, such as counter-terrorism. In the long-term, however, the process of immigration will not stop, nor should it. The security context only promotes instability in a population that is increasingly polarized, and makes its citizens afraid of a phenomenon that is inescapable, necessary, and beneficial to themselves and their countrymen and women.

Wars, or more specifically the ability to politicize wars, are of the utmost political capital during any election cycle. They arm either side with a highly emotional charge resonating deep in to the voters conscience. ‘BRING OUR BOYS HOME NOW’ or ‘WE WILL NOT SURRENDER’. The problem for candidates that are elected on these types of knee-jerk reactionary issues, as President Obama is indeed discovering, is that it is nearly impossible to deliver on pledges once made.

Osama bin Laden, making his yearly, boring and un-nuanced speech on the anniversary of 9/11 makes one glaring and accurate statement. President Obama is unable to stop the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It’s not so much that he does not possess the authority or the will, because he does. Nor is it a Republican opposition or Democratic ineptitude. The hard truth is that Barack Obama is unable to stop these wars because America’s role in the region is entirely reactionary, and her fate rests in the hands of others.

That is the great difficulty facing the American administration. Success in Iraq is now in the hands of the Iraqi military and political leadership. While patrols have been delegated to the countryside and less populated regions, an American military presence will remain in the country until Iraqi legitimacy and authority takes firm roots. We’re not talking years, we’re talking decades.

The same situation exists in Afghanistan. NATO forces, once engaged in specific and surgical warfare against Taliban fighters, are now fighting a war of attrition: trading cities when possible and sacking towns at the expense of leaving others vulnerable to attack. One can only imagine how long this will persist.

Mr. Obama is now facing a serious crisis of confidence amongst his electorate for very genuine reasons. He was elected as a dynamic and flashy candidate, yet the great issues of his presidency are boring, detailed, and infinitely complex. Those who campaign for an immediate end to both wars are misguided, diluted by rigid ideology, or simply ignorant of the facts. It is quite necessary to end both wars, but it is not in America’s best interest to do so now. Both Bin laden and President Obama know this.

So what is to be done? Unfortunately for the American administration, and much to the chagrin of diehard democrats, it is now the time to ‘stay the course’. Mr. Obama is not about to reverse the numerous successes in Iraq, nor is he about to return Afghanistan to the hands of murderers. Attrition is better than defeat, especially when the stakes are this high. Bin Laden knows that. President Obama knows that. The real difficulty is selling that hard reality to the American people.

Mustafa Abul-Yazeed, al-Qaeda’s leader in Afghanistan, threatened the United States in recent days, claiming that if the terrorist organization were to acquire Pakistani nuclear devices, they would immediately be used against American targets. “By God’s will, the Americans will not seize the Muslims’ nuclear weapons and we pray that the Muslims will have these weapons and they will be used against the Americans,” he said in a recent interview with al Jazeera media.

When asked about al Qaeda’s strength and relationship with Taliban elements in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Abul-Yazeed struck a defiant tone. “We believe in the same principles about jihad, faith and loyalty. They were attacked by the Pakistani army when they protected us. We always defend each other.’

The al Qaeda leader went on to defend his organizations apparent inability to follow up the attacks of September 11^th, 2001 with another ‘spectacular’ event. “We replaced the big operation implemented against our enemies with small ones as we achieved our great goals from launching massive operations,” he said. “We will never abandon the big operations…We already planned for some but they were postponed due to certain circumstances.”

This new, pragmatic approach from al Qaeda leadership is a notable departure from the style and substance of both Osama bin laden and Dr. al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s top brass. It is free of ideology, sweeping statements against the west, and religious terminology. Instead, abul-Yazeed strikes a new tone as a battle hardened military leader, not a Muslim cleric. This is a very, very smart move.

Since 2005, Muslim perceptions of al Qaeda and similar organization took a turn for the worse. As America’s image slowly improves throughout the region, the laundry list of grievances against the ‘west’ becomes less and less relevant. Couple this fact with pro western elections in Lebanon, pseudo-revolutionary fervor in Iran, and military successes in the Swat Valley of Pakistan. Although al Qaeda remains violent, extremely dangerous, and retains a pan-Islamic jihadi ideology, we can see its message falling out of fashion on the Muslim street, the heart of the movement. Abul-Yazeed’s new approach is to regain momentum by appealing to qualities that all Muslims (and all people for that fact) can support: Loyalty, equality, security, and pragmatism.

Above all else, it is this pragmatic bent that should worry counter-terrorism officials in the region and around the world. Al Qaeda has always been resourceful, yet its biggest weakness following 2001 had been its ambitiousness. Osama bin Laden envisioned a pan-Islamic state, spreading from Spain to eastern Asia. Dr. Al-Zawahiri spoke of a Muslim superpower that would eventually defeat the United States and govern the world. Both envisioned massive, massive attacks that would slowly escalate and destabilize the world order. Now, Abul-Yazeed speaks of tactical necessity, pragmatic military operations, and a sobering willingness to use nuclear weapons against America should they be acquired. This is not bravado, ego, or a public relations campaign, this is his battle plan. Be warned.

President Obama travels to the Middle East, and Osama releases a new audio message. Indeed, this is no coincidence.

Today, President Obama touched down in Saudi Arabia for talks with King Abdullah and various diplomats. The conversations will no doubt center on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the Saudi-sponsored roadmap. The trip then proceeds to Egypt, where the President is to make a highly-anticipated speech on US-Muslim relations.

Amidst this swirl of activity, Osama bin Laden has (purportedly) released a new audio message directed at President Obama, the Pakistani authorities, and the American people. The speaker attacks America’s policies towards Pakistan, particularly in regards to the Taliban, claiming Pres. Obama is ‘walking the same road of his predecessors to build enmity against Muslims and increasing the number of fighters, and establishing more lasting wars’.

“All this led to the displacement of about a million Muslim elders, women and children from their villages and homes. They became refugees in tents after they were honored in their own homes,” the message said.

“This basically means that Obama and his administration put new seeds of hatred and revenge against America. The number of these seeds is the same as the number of those victims and refugees in Swat and the tribal area in northern and southern Waziristan. The American people need to prepare to only gain what those seeds bring up.”

Mr. Bin Laden, if it his voice, is no novice of public relations. He understands all too well the importance and impact of President Obama’s Middle East mission. The timing and purpose of this message is revealing in several ways.

Primarily, Osama bin Laden is hoping to remain relative in a drastically changed landscape since 2001. From the turn of the century until 2003, bin Laden was the lion and savior of the jihadi movement. But relative success in Iraq, a surprising rejection of al-Qaeda throughout the region, and the election of President Obama has hurt his legitimacy and importance. By taking Obama head on, bin Laden hopes to increase his image as the quintessential anti-American. But will this resonate throughout the region? I find it rather hard to believe that Muslims throughout the Islamic world will look at the conflict in Pakistan and blame America and Pakistani authorities instead of the much-maligned Taliban.

Furthermore, the message hopes to prove that (barring all conspiracy theories) bin Laden is still alive and somewhat involved in news and developments.

This message does not bode well for bin Laden. It shows him worried, both about his public perception as well as Pakistani military successes in the Swat Valley. For a man whose major asset is his image, going head to head against President Obama in a PR campaign is not likely to end well. Even in the Middle East.

Terrorism is not a Clash of Civilizations, but a Clash of Time

Samuel Huntington forever changed the face of international political discourse when he published The Clash of Civilizations. It redefined the world not along political boundaries or geographic features, but along the delicate fault-lines of civilization and culture. In his 1993 article, he writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.

Huntington was wrong. As we progress further and further in to the post Cold-War world, it is becoming clear that we are not entering an era where civilizations are at war, but time itself. The rise of terror, America’s ‘War on Terror’, and other conflicts are not being waged along cultural lines, but between those who seek to progress towards the future and those who seek to revert to the past.

The war in Iraq, Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, tensions in Saudi Arabia, rise of authoritarianism in Russia; all of these conflicts are not between civilizations, but within civilizations. That is single greatest flaw in Huntington’s approach. The battle between reversion and progress does not take place externally, but from within specific cultures.

The war on international terrorism is not a war between western nations and their Muslim enemies, but between modern Islamic governments and terrorist organizations wishing to return to the eighth century. The same is true in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. There is no renewed cold-war between Russia and the United States, but a cold-war within Russia between industro-capitalist democrats and those wishing to return to the glory days of the mid 20^th century. In America, the much-hyped ‘Culture War’ between secular leftists and traditional conservatives has been waged since the 1960s. The list goes on.

While alliances are indeed forged along similar cultures and tongues, they are not maintained so easily. On the flip of that coin, it is a simplification to argue that nations of varying civilizations will inevitably conflict. For the time being, religion and location and culture and history are irrelevant. The only question to be asked is: Who’s going my way?

To describe the two-term Presidency of George W. Bush as ‘conventional’ is like calling Hurricane Katrina a ‘light drizzle’.  While passions remain high on both faces of the political coin, it is impossible to properly understand his actions and legacy so close to his tenure in office.  As time goes on, and the Obama administration begins to distance itself from its predecessor, the true impact of George W. begins to crystallize. A self-described ‘war President’, his lasting implications are in the field of national security and counter-terrorism.  Stripped down from all bravado, ego, politicization, posturing, and blunders, George Bush bequeathed to America one lasting and priceless reality.  Against all odds, and partially brought about by repeated failures, his administration managed to entangle the once global al Qaeda in to the national and ethnic divisions that entangle us all.  In other words, he placed the pan-Islamic terror organization in a time machine, pressed fast forward, and brought them to the modern age of the nation-state.

Compare this statement:

“We are the children of an Islamic nation whose leader is Mohammed. We have one religion, one God, one book, one prophet, one nation. Our book teaches us to be brothers of a faith. All the Muslims are brothers.” – Osama bin Laden October 2001.

With these:

“It [Iran] caused itself and the Shiites following it a historic disgrace. The signs of this stab will remain vivid in the Muslims’ memory for a very long time. The strange paradox to which I would like to draw attention is that despite the fact that Iran permitted the Crusader troops to enter Iraq, recognized the agent government there, and pushed its militias to participate in this government’s army, security services, and police force.” – Dr. Al-Zawahiri 200

“The leadership of Hamas government has committed an aggression against the rights of the Islamic nation by accepting what it called… respecting international agreements.  I am sorry to have to offer the Islamic nation my condolences for the [virtual demise] of the Hamas leadership as it has fallen in the quagmire of surrender.” Dr. Al-Zawahiri 2007

These statements offer a clear insight in to the (d)evolution of the global jihadi movement.  Once committed to a global, transnational identity, al Qaeda and its followers have become embroiled in inter-Muslim conflicts and rivalries.  While Bin Laden once sought to sooth Sunni – Shi’ah divisions, al-Zawahiri now openly exploits these differences to incite Sunni-inspired jihad across the region.  Similarly, the working relationships that formed as a unified opposition to Israel (Hamas, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Iran, and al Qaeda) have begun to dissolve.  It seems that while bombs and bullets can kill terrorists, only politics can kill an ideology. 

So what has caused these divisions?  Is it directly related to the policies of the Bush administration?  Ironically, I believe that it is George Bush’s failures that have given America this opportunity.   Critics accused his measures as draconian, outdated, and more befitting the cold-war period.  These characterizations have been proven accurate, as America has yet to defeat al Qaeda and its sympathizers.  What the critics failed to see, however, is that while his strategy was ill-equipped to defeat the global jihadi movement, George Bush managed to compartmentalize the movement in to units that are now far easier to confront.  Simply put, because GWB stubbornly refused to confront his enemy as a global movement, he forced it in to the boundaries of the modern nation state.  Terrorists once bent on global domination are now embroiled in Talibani resistance, Hamas vs. Fatah power struggles, and the Iraqi insurgency.

Had he chosen the other option, and ‘gone global’ as many were advocating, ponder the possible outcomes.   Terrorists that have been drawn to Iraq like moths to a flame would have remained in their home countries, plotting further attacks against American interests.  Sunni al Qaeda and Shi’ah Hezbollah would have remained united against Israel.  The working relationship between Iranian leadership and al Qaeda leadership would have increased the likelihood of a nuclear-armed terror cell. 

George W Bush set out to defeat al Qaeda, and in that mission he has failed.  Yet his failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the jihadi movement to think, act, and fight as if it were a nation-state. Drawn to various locations and causes, such as the Taliban controlled region of Northwest Pakistan, these terrorists are now easier to locate, track, and kill.  This is the second act in the west’s fight against al Qaeda.  While GWB might have played the well-meaning but mistaken leader in Act I, he has set the stage for the final showdown.  

Israeli authorities successfully diffused a ‘massive’ car-bomb in the northern city of Haifa on Saturday evening.  Over 100 kilograms of explosives were found, more than five times the amount necessary to level a municipal bus or truck.  The automobile was parked outside a mall, and appears to have targeted civilian shoppers as they entered or exited the building. 

What troubles counter-terror officials most is how this vehicle, reportedly stolen from East Jerusalem, was packed with explosives and relocated to Haifa without detection at various checkpoints.  Israeli officials repeatedly hail the West Bank barrier as a major factor in reducing terrorist activity within the Jewish state, but are worried a sophisticated new cell has found ways around such obstacles. 

Fortunately for local officials, the bomb was found and diffused after an apparent failed detonation.  Explosive materials, ball bearings, and other evidence have been taken from the scene.

It is unclear as to whether or not the attempted bombing was related to the new government coalition led by right-wing Israeli politician Benjamin Netanyahu.  While the new Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that he will be a ‘peace partner’ with the Palestinian authority, skeptics remain cautious as to the merits of this claim.  

American law enforcement expects, and often receives, an extremely high level of cooperation from various Muslim communities throughout the United States.  Iranians, Iraqis, Saudis, Egyptians; most are well integrated within their local communities and establishments. As a result, the threat of domestic terrorism is often lower in the US than in other western nations with a more radicalized Muslim minority, such as the United Kingdom or France.  However, one particular segment of an isolated community is beginning to trouble counter-terror officials; recent immigrants from Somalia. 

A recent hearing, conducted by the Senate Homeland and Governmental Affairs Committee, was troubled by increased recruitment of Somali-American youth by al-Shabaab.  According to the State Dept., this terrorist organization is well armed, strategically sophisticated, and enjoys extensive relationships with other al Qaeda affiliates. 

“Over the last two years, individuals from the Somali community in the United States, including American citizens, have left for Somalia to support and in some cases fight on behalf of al-Shabaab,” said Senator Lieberman.

Concerns over al-Shabaab began late last year.  Shirwa Ahmed, a Somali-American was radicalized in his home state of Minnesota, and then sent to Somalia where he killed himself and 29 others in a suicide bombing.  More distressing than the involvement of an American citizen, is the fact that he was approached, recruited, and radicalized not in Somalia, but in the United States.

State Dept. officials are attempting to determine the causes of these recent developments.  Why is the Somali community more susceptible to recruitment than other local Muslim minorities?  Experts contend that the Somali community is more isolated than others because of more recent waves of immigration (primarily throughout the 1990s, after American intervention in the region), and less adaptability towards the American way of life. 

The greatest concern to law enforcement agencies, more than those radicalized individuals leaving the United States, is these same individuals returning with the intention of conducting terror attacks.  The majority of these youths are American citizens, and travel between the US and Somalia is hardly restrictive with proper paperwork and familial requirements. 

The only way to combat this threat is to eliminate the problem at its root cause.  Unlike Saudi youth living in Riyadh, or Egyptian youth in Cairo, the US Government has the opportunity and obligation to reach out to the American-Somali community, and ensure that if fundamentalist recruitment is taking place, they all have a shared investment in approaching local authorities. 

Over the past week, two new polls have been released which paint an interesting picture of opinions and attitudes within the Muslim World. First, a New York Times poll asked Muslims all over the world whether they felt as if they were ‘thriving’, ‘struggling’, or ‘suffering’.

Out of 14 countries (ten predominately Muslim nations and four western nations), American Muslims were among the most satisfied populations, with 41% feeling as if they were ‘thriving’ and 3% feeling as if they were ‘suffering’. That is the third highest satisfaction rate, behind only Germany and Saudi Arabia, and the second lowest dissatisfaction rate, behind Saudi Arabia. This contrasts sharply with the United Kingdom, where a mere 7% feel as if they are ‘thriving’, and 93% either ‘struggling’ or ‘suffering’.

The Second poll, released by World Public Opinion, focuses specifically on the Islamic World. It gauges the attitudes of average citizens and their opinions towards U.S. military presence and suicide attacks. The poll finds that while an overwhelming majority rejects attacks on civilians, a strong majority supports Al Qaeda’s goal of removing US troops from Muslim land; with majorities in several nations favoring attacks on US military personnel.

These findings are interesting in that they represent the clear split between Muslims living within the Muslim world, and those living in some western countries, mainly Germany and the United States. For instance, of those polled in Pakistan, only 1% believe a strong US military presence is beneficial to their lives. However, 89% of Pakistanis believe that they are either ‘struggling’ or ‘suffering’.

Even France, with high levels of Muslim dissatisfaction ranks above Morocco, Iran, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan. What this suggests, is that while Muslim populations fair better outside the Muslim world, there still exists high levels of animosity towards the very societies within which they thrive.

The reasons and motivations vary. Leaders inside the Islamic World often use the United States and West as a scapegoat, diverting dissatisfaction away from local regimes. The United States too shares a good deal of the blame; no one appreciates uninvited guests. Yet there exists opportunity in these polls, for if these populations, separated by some Islamic Curtain between the Muslim and Western worlds, were to reconcile, all would be better off.

It is impossible to exaggerate the recklessness and danger brought about by Pakistan’s decision to acquiesce the Swat Valley to Taliban authorities.  Superficially, the transfer of power is bad for Pakistan as a nation, South Asia as a region, and the worldwide effort against Islamic fundamentalism.  In the grand scheme, however, the new region does offer some serious opportunities for America and her allies.  Here are some immediate implications:

 Further Erosion of the Already Porous Border:  It is unlikely, if not incomprehensible, that Taliban authorities will oversee a strict border policy between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  This has dire consequences for NATO and American forces, many of whom are ineligible to violate Pakistani sovereignty.   This not only provides a safe haven for suspected terrorists, but also allows the infiltration of Afghanistan from extremists in the Pakistan’s North West provinces. 

 International Status:  What will be the international classification of this new region?  Is it under Pakistani control? Who will the United Nations address to rectify grievances?  For such a troubled region, it further complicates the issue of sovereignty and legitimacy.  The area will no doubt contain various high level al-Qaeda targets, yet proper diplomatic and government channels are essentially non-existent. 

Increased Legitimacy:  Once regarded as an insurgent, terrorist organization, the Taliban has been granted an increased level of legitimacy by the Pakistani authorities.  If recognized as a proper institutionalized government, military operations become muddied and raise legal complications.

 The Bright Side: There is, however, a silver lining in all of this.  If I were to view the situation optimistically, I would argue this overarching theory.  Pakistan realized that they were engaged in an unwinnable struggle.  The only hope of victory was a sweeping American presence, which they understood would be intolerable both politically and socially.  In granting the Taliban control over the region, they are removing themselves from the conflict, while at the same time opening the door for unlimited American military operations.  They can protest, burn effigies, and march as much as they want.  The bottom line is that the US military is no longer violating Pakistani sovereignty, it is violating Taliban sovereignty.  In that conflict, even the most hard-headed anti-Americanist knows the more dangerous of the two. 

 Pakistan has finally realized they need to amputate the leg to save the body.  Now it is up to the surgeon.